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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No, 900341-CA
Priority No. 2

CAROL S. CANDELARIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 77-35-26(2)(a)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Annotated
78-2a-3(2)(j)(e), (1953 as amended) whereby the defendant in a
criminal action may take an appeal from a final judgment and
conviction

in

this

court

for

matters

concerning

criminal

convictions less than first degree felonies.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was Appellant entitled to be sentenced and punished for

a misdemeanor rather than as a felony?
2.

Was counsel for appellant ineffective for failing to

object to the Information and jury instruction concerning elements
in this case.
A.

Did the Information filed in the matter fail to

1

state an offense and was otherwise deficient in informing appellant
of the crime with which she was charged?
B.

Did

the

jury

instruction

concerning

elements

misstate the correct elements of the offense?

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of those statutes and constitutional provisions that
do not appear in the body of the brief are included in Appendix A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
These issues are questions of law, which are granted no
deference on review, but the conviction is reversed if incorrect.
State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2nd 326, 327 (Utah App. ) cert, denied, 782
P. 2nd 878 (Utah 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted by a jury of fraudulently obtaining
welfare assistance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 55-15a-31(l) (1953 as amended) (R. 6; R.
126).
At the close of the State's case, counsel moved to dismiss the
matter on the grounds that the State had not presented sufficient
evidence (T. 251).

In the alternative, it was argued that the

Court should reduce the charge from a second degree felony,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 55-15a-31(1), (1953 as
amended) to a class B misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
2

Section 55-153-30, (1953 as amended), and because the two statutes
prohibited the same conduct and appellant was entitled to the
lesser penalty (T. 251, 252, 258-259).
Counsel for appellant failed to object to the sufficiency of
the Information filed in the above matter and to the elements jury
instruction.

Such failure constituted the ineffective assistance

of counsel.

The sentence of appellant was suspended and she was

placed on probation by the Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was charged in an Information with a violation of
Utah Code Annotated Section 55-15a-31(l) (1953 as amended) and
accused of making false statements to the State of Utah, Assistance
Payments Administration, in that she failed to report assets and
income which would have effected
assistance.
miscalculated

her eligibility

for public

She then received public assistance that had been
as a result of these omissions

of

fact which

represented an overpayment to her.
Linda Hirst presented evidence that appellant had received
$5,375.00 in AFDC payments from September 1985 through November
1986 (T. 56-61).

Clyde Nuzman presented evidence that appellant

had received $2,019.00 in food stamps from September 1985 through
November 1986 (T.63-66).

LaRene S. Park presented evidence that

appellant had received $892.45 in Medicaid from October through
December 1985 (T. 67-70).
Terrell Nagata presented bank records from the J.A.C.L. Credit
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Union on three separate accounts. One account was Ms. Candelariafs
and it had earned approximately $200.00 in interest in 1985, and
she withdrew $3,873.65 from the account in November of 1986 (T. 7082).

One account was Joseph Candelariaf s (appellantf s son).

Appellant and Joseph Candelaria were authorized to withdraw from
the

account,

which

contained

$3,068.35

in

September

1985.

$2,903.07 was withdrawn by appellant in November of 1986 (T. 8386).

The other account was Candice Candelariafs

(appellant's

daughter). Appellant and Candice were authorized to withdraw from
the account. $3,001.65 was withdrawn by appellant in November 1986
(T. 86-89).

Mr. Nagata indicated that the accounts may have been

trust accounts (T. 93), that the accounts were held in the credit
union when the credit union offered matching funds life insurance
for deposits up to $4,000.00 and that the withdrawals from the
accounts in November occurred when Ms. Candelaria came to the
credit union with her mother, Doris Matsuura, and had the funds
transferred to Mrs. Matsuurafs account (T. 93-95, 97).
Shirley

Barker presented

evidence concerning

appellant's

banking at Zion's First National Bank. Two trust accounts, one for
Candice Candelaria and the other for Joseph Candelaria, were
subject to withdrawal by appellant and her mother (T.102-103, 116).
The balance on both accounts in 1986 was $1,159.71 (T. 104). One
checking account, subject to withdrawal by appellant, her mother
and her brother, Gregory Matsuura, received numerous deposits and
checks written to Ms. Candelaria from various parties (T. 104-114).
The Social Security numbers on the checking account apparently
4

changed as Mr. and Mrs. Matsuura became authorized to withdraw from
the account (T. 120). Ms. Barker indicated that the balances shown
on the bank statements might not match those of the account holder,
because the account holder might be deducting checks from the
balance before they cleared the bank (T. 121). Ms. Barker did not
know if there were penalties for withdrawal from the trust account
funds and indicated that the checking account would be charged a
service fee if the balance dropped below $600.00 (T. 115-118).
Gregory Matsuura testified that his name was placed on the
Zion's bank account so that the money would be accessible in the
event

of Ms. Candelaria's death and

that he had

involvement in the account beyond that (T. 121-124).

no actual
He also

testified that his mother had created an account for him at the
J.A.C.L. when he was a child, as she had for his brother and
sister, and that she gave him freedom to use the money in that
account when he got married (T. 125-126).

He did not know if his

brother had been given permission to use his J.A.C.L. account and
indicated that he did not think that appellant had been given
permission to use her J.A.C.L. funds (T. 126).
Katherine Bogk testified that during 1985-1986, she employed
appellant part-time at her beauty salon, paying her sixty percent
(60%) of the price paid by customers and providing supplies (T.
128-135).

She indicated that appellant used her own supplies when

she did her mother's hair.
Melodee Williams testified as appellant's self-sufficiency
counselor and recalled that appellant had asked her unspecified
5

questions about the assistance policies and procedures.

Ms.

Williams had not told Ms. Candelaria to refrain from reporting
income and assets (T. 139-144).

She indicated that the policies

and procedures governing the assistance programs were hundreds of
pages long, complex and subject to interpretations by Ms. Williams'
supervisor (T. 147-148).
Donna Kramer testified that those receiving assistance are
told verbally and in writing to report all of their income, assets
and

changes

in

circumstances

relating

to

their

assistance

eligibility and informed that they can be prosecuted for fraud (T.
154-163).

She indicated that the policies governing the systems

eligibility change monthly and are hundreds of pages long (T. 170).
Robert Banta testified that appellant was not eligible to
receive the assistance she had received from September 1985 through
November 1986 because of the money in the Credit Union and the
Zion's Bank accounts and because of her employment and other income
(T. 181-226).

He indicated that if appellant has money in trusts

which are not accessible, those funds would not be considered in
terms of appellant's eligibility.
In defense of appellant, her mother, Doris Matsuura, testified
that she had opened up accounts for her three children at the
J.A.C.L. Credit Union in 1955. The accounts were not to be used by
the children without her consent because they were intended to
provide life insurance benefits to them in the event of her death
(T. 263-267).

Ms. Candelaria was not authorized to use the funds

held in her name or in the names of her children, Joseph and
6

Candice, at the J.A.C.L. Credit Union (T. 269-270). Mrs. Matsuura
indicated that she provided $2,000.00 for appellant's checking
account at Zion's Bank to alleviate the need for Ms. Candelaria to
pay fees on the account and that the money was not to be used by
Ms. Candelaria (T. 270-272). Mrs. Matsuura also testified that the
two other Zion's Bank accounts contained her money and not that of
appellant.

In cross examination, it was apparently the State's

position that the documents describing the bank accounts were not
sufficiently specific to corroborate Mrs. Matsuura's testimony (T.
273-287).
Appellant testified that she received a $1,000.00 settlement
from her previous employer, Wasatch Opinion Research, for work she
had done in the past and did not report the settlement as income
because she did not think it needed to be reported.

She indicated

that when she worked for Mrs. Bogk at the beauty salon, she was
working one day a week for three or four hours and buying her own
supplies.

Consequently, she did not make a profit that needed to

be reported as income (T. 293-296).

She indicated that when she

worked for Mary Kay Cosmetics, she lost money and made no income
(T.296-297).
Appellant indicated that when she applied for assistance as of
September 1985, she told her assistance advisor, Peggy Harrison,
about her mother's trust account in her and her children's names
and was told that since the money was her mother's, Ms. Candelaria
did not have to report it (T. 309). She indicated that she did not
knowingly falsify anything on her assistance applications (T. 309).
7

In November 1986, when appellant was notified that she would
be responsible for her mother's money and would have to repay the
assistance she had received, she explained the situation to a
different assistance counselor, who told her to have her name taken
off the accounts (T. 311 )•
brought letters from the

She followed this instruction and

J.A.C.L. and Zion's Bank to verify the

transactions (T.311-313).
Counsel
sufficiency

for
of

appellant

the

raised

Information

no

issue

filed

against

concerning
her,

the

although

arguments were made regarding the nature of the penalty which could
be imposed.

Instruction 11 of the instructions given to the jury

an outline the elements of the offense.
to that instruction.

Counsel failed to object

No alternative instruction was submitted by

counsel for appellant concerning the elements of the offense.
The Court took under advisement counsel's Motion to Dismiss
the Information because the evidence was insufficient or, in the
alternative, to reduce the penalty.

That Motion was never

explicitly ruled upon, however, the matter was submitted to the
jury, there was a conviction as charged, appellant was sentenced
accordingly.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant

was

entitled

to

be

sentenced

as

a

class

B

misdemeanor because the two sections at issue punish the same
conduct as was alleged by the State.
Counsel for appellant was ineffective in that she failed to
8

object to the sufficiency of the Information filed in the above
matter and to the elements instruction outlining the offense.
The Information was deficient because it failed to properly
state the elements of the offense to which she was charged.

The

elements jury instruction misstated the correct elements for which
she was charged.
Consequently, as a matter of due process of law, equal
protection of the law and the effective assistance of counsel,
appellant is entitled to a reversal of her conviction.

POINT I
DID EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW
REQUIRE THE COURT TO SENTENCE APPELLANT TO
THE PENALTY OF A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR?
Two

provisions

of

law

were

applicable

to

allegations in the prosecution against appellant.
prohibited her conduct.

the

factual

Both statutes

Appellant had been accused of failing to

disclose certain facts which would effect the calculation of her
ability to receive public assistance.
Title 55, Chapter 15a, Section 30 provides, in part, as
follows:
Failure to disclose certain facts
Misdemeanor.
(1) No person shall knowingly, by false
statement, misrepresentation, impersonation or
other fraudulent means, fail to disclose any
reduction in household composition, employment
changes, changes in marital status, receipt of
other monetary assistance, receipt of in-kind
gifts or an other material fact or change in

9

circumstances used in making, or which would
affect, the determination of that person's
eligibility to receive aid or benefits under
any state or federally funded assistance
program. . . .
(3) The violation of any provision of
this section shall constitute a class B
misdemeanor.
Title 55, Chapter 15a, Section 31 was the statute upon which
the prosecution was based and provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Failure to disclose certain facts
Criminal Penalties.
(1) No person shall fail to disclose any
change in circumstances, as provided in
Section 55-15a-30, for the purpose of
obtaining, or continuing to receive, funds or
other benefits to which that person is not
entitled, or in an amount larger than that to
which he is entitled. . . .
(7) The punishment for the offense of
this section are as follows;
(a) as a felony of the second
degree if the value of the funds or
other
benefits
received,
misappropriated, claimed, or applied
for exceeds $1,000;
(b) as a felony of the third
degree if the value of the funds or
other
benefits
received,
misappropriated, claimed, or applied
for is more than $250 but not more
that $1,000;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor
if the value of the funds or other
benefits received, misappropriated,
claimed, or applied for is more than
$100 but not more than $250;
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if
the value of the funds or other
benefits received, misappropriated,
claimed, or applied for is $100 or
less.
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) established, in
Utah, the principle that, as a matter of equal protection under the
10

law, where there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct,
but provide two different penalties, a defendant is entitled to be
sentenced pursuant to the lower penalty.

(Amendment XIV,

U.S.

Constitution; Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution; Appendix
A.)
In State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985), the defendant was
convicted of two counts of manslaughter.

The Utah Supreme Court

determined that the defendant should have been sentenced pursuant
to the penalty for negligent homicide because the conduct of the
defendant alleged by the prosecution was prohibited by both the
manslaughter and negligent homicide provisions of the Utah Code.
Citing State v. Twitchell, 333 P. 2d 1075 (Utah 1959), the
Court concluded:
". . . If the same identical facts may be used
in
prosecutions
under
two
completely
integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the
other a felony (the defendant is entitled to
the lesser penalty) Bryan at page 317; 333 P.
2d at page 1077."
The Court concluded in Bryan:
". . .We cannot change the legislative policy
with respect to the penalties embodied in the
statutes at issue. Nevertheless, we cannot
disregard our evenhanded application of the
criminal laws. Equal protection of the law
guarantees like treatment of all those who are
similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal
laws must be written so that there are
significant differences between offenses and
so that the exact same conduct is not subject
to different penalties depending upon which of
two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to
charge. To allow that would be to allow a
form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our
system of law."
11

Bryan, supra, at page 263.
The thrust of the case against appellant was that she had
failed to disclose certain facts which effected her eligibility for
public assistance.
basis.

The case was submitted to the jury on that

There were two basic defenses to that allegation.

First,

that monies held in the bank accounts need not have been reported
because appellant did not have authorized access thereto.

Income

from employment was illusory and also need not have been reported.
Secondly, that appellant did not intend to fail to report that
which she needed to report.

She was under a misimpression of her

alleged obligation to report assets held in the bank accounts and
her employment situation.
There was evidence that appellant had received and obtained
funds to which she was not entitled as a result of her failure to
report material facts which would effect her eligibility. However,
receipt of funds is not part of the definition of either of these
applicable statutes. Rather, the difference between Section 30 and
Section 31 is that the state must show that appellant had a purpose
of obtaining benefits to which she was not entitled.

This is the

difference between cause and effect. The state attempted to prove
no more in the case than that appellant knowingly made or knowingly
omitted to make statements and provide information which would
effect her eligibility.
conduct.

Both of these statutes prohibit that

Consequently, upon appellant's conviction, she was

entitled to the lesser penalty provided in Section 30.
Pursuant to Section 31, the actual amount of funds received to
12

which a person was not entitled concerns only the degree of penalty
and not the elements of the offense.

Both of these statutory

provisions include the fraudulent intent and purpose to obtain
funds to which you are not entitled.
encompass

other

fraudulent

Section 30 would also

intentions

and

purposes

beyond

attempting to obtain welfare assistance to which you were not
entitled.

The definition of a Section 31 offense is included

within Section 30.
Consequently, under the facts of this case, both these
statutes prohibited appellants conduct.

POINT II
WAS APPELLANT DENIED HER RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF FAILING TO OBJECT
TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION AND THE RECITATION OF
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS?

Counsel for appellant failed to pursue, by objection or
otherwise, arguments that effected

the substantial

rights of

appellant in two regards. First, there were issues concerning the
sufficiency

of the Information which was filed

appellant of that with which she was charged.
Instruction

11 outlined

Instruction

misstates

the elements of

those

elements.

and

informed

Secondly, Jury

the offense.
(Amendment

That

VI, U.S.

Constitution; Article I, Section 7; Utah Constitution; Appendix A.)
Argument on those two issues is set forth below.

If there is

merit thereto, then appellant is entitled to a reversal of her
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conviction.
In Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), pursuant to the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United
States Supreme Court guaranteed that a defendant in a criminal
proceeding had a right to the assistance of counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984) and United
States v. Cronic, 446 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme Court expanded
upon that basic Sixth Amendment principle to include the concept
that the assistance of counsel must also be effective.
The test of whether a counself s performance is ineffective to
the extent that a conviction in a criminal matter must be reversed,
is twofold. There must be a showing that counsel's performance was
deficient. That is, that counsel failed to do some act or to take
necessary steps that would have protected the fundamental rights of
the defendant and the fairness of the trial. There must also be a
showing of prejudice.

That is to say, that those fundamental

rights were, in fact, effected by the deficient performance.
In State v. Moritzsky. 771 P. 2d 688 (Ut. App. 1989) this
Court,

in reviewing

a question of ineffective

assistance of

counsel, determined that a reviewing court must examine counself s
performance to determine if it is deficient.

The Court stated:

"We must . . . determine if counsel's
deficient
performance
undermines
our
confidence in the verdict against the
defendant. Specifically, we must decide if a
reasonable probability exists that the jury's
verdict would have been more favorable to
defendant had the proper instruction been
given . . . "
supra. at page 692
14

In this matter, the deficient performance of counsel as it
pertains to the Information and the jury instructions is an
explanation for the general rule that failing to object constitutes
a waiver.

If there are errors in the Information and jury

instructions, then this Court can determine that the failure of
counsel to object does not preclude appellant from raising the
issues on appeal.
Alternatively, aside from the effectiveness of counsel, the
errors complained of were such as to constitute "plain error".
Pursuant to this doctrine, the court can determine the merits of
the argument See State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336 (Utah App. 1990).

A.

DOES THE INFORMATION FAIL TO STATE AN OFFENSE
ENTITLING APPELLANT TO REVERSAL?

As a matter of due process of law, if the Information fails to
state an offense or is factually defective, appellant is entitled
to a reversal of her conviction. (Amendment XIV, U.S. Constitution;
Appendix A and C.)
In State v. Garcia, 774 P. 2d 1029 (Utah App. 1987), defendant
was charged with two counts of aggravated assault.

This Court

determined that Count I was properly supported by the evidence.
However, Count II was defective because, in the charging document,
it was

alleged

that

defendant

had

assaulted

the

threatening to do bodily injury to her brother-in-law.

victim

by

There was

a factual defect in the application of the in that the definition
of "another".

The statute defining the elements of aggravated

15

assault, refers to the victim.
had

been

directed

to

the

In the Garcia matter, the threat
alleged

victim's

brother-in-law.

Consequently, the Information had failed to state a proper offense.

"Where a conviction rests on an Information
which fails to state an offense, a reversal is
proper."
Supra. at 1031.
In People v. Puioue, 320 N.E. 78 (111. 1974), the defendant
was charged with the unlawful use of weapons. The Complaint failed
to allege that the pistol used by defendant was loaded.
an essential element of the offense.

This was

Upon a challenge to the

sufficiency of the Complaint, following defendant's conviction, the
Court ordered a reversal.
In this case, the elements of the offense had been improperly
stated in the Information. The provisions of Title 55 Chapter 15a
Section 31 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), provide that no
person shall fail to disclose any change in circumstances referred
to in the preceding Section 30 for the purpose of obtaining
benefits to which that person is not entitled.

The Information,

however, although citing to the statutory provisions, alleges that
appellant stole and converted to her own use public assistance.
The concepts of stealing and converting are not part of the offense
or either of these statutory provisions. Rather it is the failure
to disclose information with a purpose of obtaining benefits which
is the culpable conduct prohibited by this statute.

16

B.

DOES THE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION MISSTATE THE LAW?

In a similar manner as in the Information, Jury Instruction 11
misstates the applicable elements of the offense.

The jury

instruction uses the term "stole and converted to her own use".
However, these are not concepts that are part of the applicable
statutory definitions.
In State v. Roberts, 711 P 2d 235 (Utah 1985), defendant had
been charged with theft by deception.

Although finding that the

instruction was adequate, the Utah Supreme Court concluded,
"the general rule is that an accurate
instruction upon the basic elements of an
offense is essential."
Supra. at page 239.
In State v. Lane, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), the defendant was
also charged with theft by deception.

The Court determined that

the elements instruction was defective because of a failure to
include the element of "intent".

Again the Utah Supreme Court

concluded,
"an accurate instruction upon the basic
elements of the offense charged is essential
and the failure to so instruct constitutes
reversible error."
Supra, at page 35.
Refer to Dougherty v. State. 471 P.2d 212 (Nev. 1970); State
v. Miller, 565 P. 2d 228 (Kan. 1977); Thomas v. State, 522 P. 2d
528 (Alaska 1974).
17

The instruction on the elements given to the jury was
inaccurate and misleading for two reasons.

First, it added two

elements, stealing and converting, which are not part of the
offense charged.

Secondly, it failed to include the concept of

failing to disclose with a purpose of obtaining assistance to which
appellant was not entitled. The jury instruction really shifts and
distorts the elements of the offense.

Consequently, appellant is

entitled to a reversal of her conviction (Appendix C ) .

CONCLUSION
On the basis that two statutes have proscribed the conduct of
appellant in this manner, she is entitled to the lesser penalty,
which is a class B misdemeanor.

On the basis that either the

Information or the elements jury instruction was inaccurate and a
misstatement,

appellant

is

entitled

to

a

reversal

of

her

conviction.

Dated this 0 / /

day of / I/JY////J71*

, 1990,

JR.
ST Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
December 1990,

19

day of

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT VI. [Rights of the accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
State and the district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendants of
witnesses in his own behalf to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases.
In no instance shall any accused persons, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall a person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

APPENDIX B

UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED
REPLACEMENT
VOLUME 6A
1985 Pocket Supplement

Containing
Amendments to statutes and new statutes in Titles 54 to 58 enacted since
publication of Replacement Volume 6A through the
1985 First Special Session of the Utah Legislature

Edited by
The Publisher's Editorial Staff

THE ALLEN SMITH COMPANY
Publishers
1435 North Meridian Street
Indianapolis. Indiana 46202

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
changes in phraseology, punctuation and
style.
Title of Act.
An act repealing and reenacting Section
55-15a-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
enacted by Chapter 122, Laws of Utah 1973,
as amended by Chapter 171, Laws of Utah
1975, and enacting Sections 55-15a-29
through 55-15a-33, Utah Code Annotated
1953; relating to improper public assistance;
requiring repayment of improperly received
public assistance; providing for legal actions
and other procedures to secure such repayments; providing for reimbursement by other

55-15a-3U

persons responsible for public assistance;
prohibiting certain acts; providing penalties
for violations; providing for certain matters
relative to civil or criminal actions pursuant
to Chapter 15a of Title 55; and providing that
the county attorney and the attorney general
shall carry out the mandates set forth in
Chapter 15a of Title 55. — Laws 1979, ch. 190.
Cross-References.
Office of Recovery Services, responsibility
for collecting public assistance payments to
ineligible persons, 55-15c-4.

55-15a-25. Appeals — Administrative review — Trial de novo in district
court — Subpoena powers. Any applicant for, or recipient of, assistance, food
stamps, or medical assistance, aggrieved because of a decision or delay in making
a decision, may appeal and is entitled to reasonable notice and a hearing. The
department through its administrative hearing examiner may, upon its own
motion, review any decision of a local or district office and consider and determine
any application upon which a decision has not been made within a reasonable time.
All decisions of the administrative hearing examiner are final and binding upon
"any local, district, or state office, except that any party may appeal an administrative order to the district court and obtain a trial de novo of the matter by filing
a petition in the appropriate district court within 30 days after receipt of notice
of the administrative order. The department shall have the power, through its
authorized hearing officer or office, to subpoena witnesses, but the subpoena power
shall be limited to hearings related to federally assisted programs administered
by the department in which subpoena power is required by the federal agency for
approval of the state plan.
'*' History: L. 1973, ch. 122, §25; 1981, ch.
117, § 1; 1984, ch. 51, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
^ The 1981 amendment added the last senlence; and made minor changes in punctuation.

The 1984 amendment inserted "through its
administrative hearing examiner" in the secon(
* sentence; substituted "administrative
hearing examiner" for "department" in the
third sentence; and added the exception to
the third sentence.

55-15a-29. Reimbursement to department — Interest. Whenever the department expends public assistance or medicaid funds on behalf of a recipient for services or supplies, for which another person is obligated to reimburse the
department, that other person shall make such reimbursement within 60 days o l
notification by the department. If reimbursement is not made within that period,
and no extension of time is granted by the department, interest shall accrue on
the unpaid balance at the rate of 8 percent per annum.
: History: C. 1953, 55-15a-29, enacted by L.
J979, ch. 190. § 2.

Cross-References.
Collection responsibility of Office of Recovery Services, 55-15c-4.

55-15a-30. Failure to disclose certain facts — Requesting payment from
Jtecipient or family — Misdemeanor. (1) No person shall knowingly, by false
jljgtement, misrepresentation, impersonation or other fraudulent means, fail to disu s e any reduction in household composition, employment changes, changes in
.marital status, receipt of other monetary assistance, receipt of in-kind gifts or any
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55-15a-31

PUBLIC WELFARE

other material fact or change in circumstances used in making, or which wc
affect, the determination of that person's eligibility to receive aid or benefits un
any state or federally funded assistance program.
'
(2) No person providing service for which compensation is paid under any st
or federally funded assistance program shall solicit, request or receive, actually
constructively, any payment or contribution through a payment, assessment, g
devise, bequest or other means, directly or indirectly, from a recipient of assistai
from that program, or such a recipient's family, unless that person shall not
the department, on a form it shall provide, of the amount of any such paymc
or contribution together with such other information as the department m
require, within ten days after the receipt of that payment or contribution or,
the payment or contribution is to become effective at a future date, within ten da
after the consummation of the agreement therefor.
(3) The violation of any provision of this section shall constitute a class B mi
demeanor.
History: C. 1953, 55-15a-30, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 190, §3.
55-15a-3L Failure to disclose certain facts — Unlawful use of food stamp
identification cards, certificates, and public assistance warrants — Fraudu
lent misappropriation by administrators — False claims — Criminal penalties
(1) No person shall fail to disclose any change in circumstances, as provided u
Section 55-15a-30, for the purpose of obtaining, or continuing to receive, funds oi
other benefits to which that person is not entitled, or in an amount larger thai
that to which hefarshe] is entitled.
(2) No person shall knowingly^raa manner net provided by law;] use, transfer,
acquire, traffic in, alter, forge, or possess any food stamp, food stamp identification
card, certificate of eligibility for medical services,far]medicaid identification card,
or public assistance warrant, in a manner not provided bg law.
(3) No person, having duties relating to the administration of any state or federally funded assistance program, shall fraudulently misappropriate any funds
[given « exchange] exchanged for food stamps, far] any food stamp, food stamp
identification card, authorization for [the] purchase of food stamps, certificate of
eligibility for medical services, medicaid identification cardx or other assistance
[from that assistance program,] with which that person has been entrusted or of
which [that person] he has gained possession by virtue of [that] his position.
(4) No person shall knowingly:
(a) file any claim for services to a recipient of benefits under any state or federally funded assistance program for services which were not rendered; far
knowingly]
(b) file or falsify any claim, report, or [documents] document required by state,
or"federal law, rule, or provider agreement for unauthorized items or services
under the program; [; knowingly]
(c) fail to credit the state for payments received irom otner services; b *now«gly]
(d) bill the recipient of benefits under the program, or the recipient's family,
for an amount in excess of that provided by law or [regulation,] rule; or [knowingly]
(e) receive any unauthorized payment as a result of [these] acts described in
this subsection.
(5) No person shall attempt to commit, or aid or abet the commission of, any
[of the aets] act prohibitedfander]by this section.
(6) The punishment for violation of any provision of this section by an assistance recipient is [to be] determined by the cumulative value of the funds or other
benefits he received [daring the time period when] in committing frauds of a similar naturex faeew] and not by each separate instance of fraud [during the time
y\,i luuj.
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(7) The punishment for the offenses of this section are as follows:
(a) as a felony of the second degreef;] if the value of the funds or other benefits
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by any person^ exceeds $1,000;
(b) as a felony of the third degreefe] if the value of the funds or other benefits
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by any person^ is more than
$250 but not more than $1,000;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor^] if the value of the funds or other benefits
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by any person]* is more than
$100 but not more than $250;
(d) as a class B misdemeanor^] if the value of the funds or other benefits
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by tmy person^ is $100 or less.
History: C. 1953, 55-15a-31, enacted by L. or provider agreement" in subsec. (4) for
1979, ch. 190, §4; L. 1981, ch. 221, §1; 1985, "any false claim"; substituted subsec (6) and
ch.7. §1.
the introductory portion of subsec (7) for
'The violation of any of the provisions of this
Compiler's Notes.
section shall be punishable as follows:';;*
s^The 1981 amendment substituted "know- inserted "misappropriated, claimed, or
jngly file or falsify any claim, report, or doc- applied" throughout subds. (7)(a) to (7)(d);
uments required by state or federal law, rule, and made minor changes in phraseology.
55-15a-32. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits — Repayment no
defense to criminal action* (1) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this
chapter, a paid state warrant made to the order of a party shall constitute prima
facie evidence that such party received assistance funds from the state.
^ (2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, all of the records
in the custody of the department relating to the application for, verification of,
issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall constitute business records
within the meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence.
(3) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the value of the
benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or usual charge for similar benefits
in the private sector. The value of an authorization to purchase food stamps, however, shall be deemed to be the difference between the coupon allotment thereon
and the amount paid by the recipient for that allotment
(4) In any criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the repayment of funds or
other benefits obtained in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall constitute
no defense to, or ground for dismissal of, that action.
, Hiitory: C. 1953, 55-15a-32, enacted by L.
1979, ck 190, §5.
55-15a-33. County attorneys and attorney general to enforce act. It shall
be the duty of each county attorney and the attorney general to carry out the
mandates set forth in this chapter.
h History: C. 1953, 55-15a-33, enacted by L.
1979. cL 190. §6.

CHAPTER 15b
BOARD AND DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
S?«ion 63-55-7 provides that the Division of Family Services terminates on July 1,1989.
* * 7 ~ ^ r Repealed:
K35b-2;~ Definitions.
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55-15a-28. Collections under lien provisions — Excess
property liens.
The office of assistance payments, through the Office of Administrative
Services of the Department of Social Services, is responsible for making collections of all funds due, or to become due, the state under § 55-15-30.
Excess property liens required in the various programs not transferred to
the federal government shall remain a condition of eligibility in the assistance payments programs.
History: L. 1973, ch. 122, § 28.

55-15a-29. Reimbursement to department — Interest.
Whenever the department expends public assistance or medicaid funds on
behalf of a recipient for services or supplies, for which another person is
obligated to reimburse the department, that other person shall make such
reimbursement within 60 days of notification by the department. If reimbursement is not made within that period, and no extension of time is granted
by the department, interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance at the rate of 8
percent per annum.
History: C. 1953,55-15a-29, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 190, § 2.
Cross-References. — Collection responsi-

bility of Office
§ 55-15c-4.

of

Recovery

Services,

55-15a-30- Failure to disclose certain facts — Requesting
payment from recipient or family — Misdemeanor.
(1) No person shall knowingly, by false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation or other fraudulent means, fail to disclose any reduction in household composition, employment changes, changes in marital status, receipt of
other monetary assistance, receipt of in-kind gifts or any other material fact
or change in circumstances used in making, or which would affect, the determination of that person's eligibility to receive aid or benefits under any state
or federally funded assistance program,
(2) No person providing service for which compensation is paid unaejr any
state or federally funded assistance program shall solicit, request or receive,
actually or constructively, any payment or contribution through a payment,
assessment, gift, devise, bequest or other means, directly or indirectly, from a
recipient of assistance from that program, or such a recipient's family, unless
that person shall notify the department, on a form it shall provide, of the
amount of any such payment or contribution together with such other information as the department may require, within ten days after the receipt of
that payment or contribution or, if the payment or contribution is to become
effective at a future date, within ten days after the consummation of the
agreement therefor.
(3) The violation of any provision of this section shall constitute a class B
misdemeanor.
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55-15a-31
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History: C. 1953, 55-15a-30, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 190, § 3.

Cross-References* — Sentencing for misde*
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

55-15a-31. Failure to disclose certain facts — Unlawful use
of food stamps, identification cards, certificates,
and public assistance warrants — Fraudulent
misappropriation by administrators — False
claims — Criminal penalties.
(1) No person shall fail to disclose any change in circumstances, as provided
in § 55-15a-30, for the purpose of obtaining, or continuing to receive, funds or
other benefits to which that person is not entitled, or in an amount larger
than that to which he is entitled.
(2) No person shall knowingly use, transfer, acquire, traffic in, alter, forge,
or possess any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate of eligibility for medical services, medicaid identification card, or public assistance
warrant, in a manner not provided by law.
(3) No person, having duties relating to the administration of any state or
federally funded assistance program, shall fraudulently misappropriate any
funds exchanged for food stamps, any food stamp, food stamp identification
card, authorization for purchase of food stamps, certificate of eligibility for
medical services, medicaid identification card, or other assistance with which
that person has been entrusted or of which he has gained possession by virtue
of his position.
(4) No person shall knowingly:
(a) file any claim for services to a recipient of benefits under any state
or federally funded assistance program for services which were not rendered;
(b) file or falsify any claim, report, or document required by state or
federal law, rule, or provider agreement, for unauthorized items or services under the program;
(c) fail to credit the state for payments received from other services;
(d) bill the recipient of benefits under the program, or the recipient's
family, for an amount in excess of that provided by law or rule; or
(e) receive any -unauthorized payment as a result of acts described in
this subsection.
(5) No person shall attempt to commit, or aid or abet the commission of, any
act prohibited by this section.
(6) The punishment for violation of any provision of this section by an
assistance recipient is determined by the cumulative value of the funds or
other benefits he received in committingfraudsof a similar nature, and not by
each separate instance of fraud.
(7) The punishment for the offenses of this section are as follows:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the value of the funds or other
benefits received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, exceeds
$1,000;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the value of the funds or other
benefits received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is more than
$250 but not more than $1,000;
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(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is more than $100 but
not more than $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is $100 or less.
(8) The criminal penalties of this section do not apply to offenses by providers under the state's medicaid program, which are actionable under Chapter 20, Title 26.
History: C. 1953, 55-15a-31, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 190, § 4; L. 1981, ch. 221, § 1; 1985,
ch. 7, S 1; 1986, ch. 46, § 10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amendment substituted "knowingly file or falsify any
daim, report, or documents required by state
or federal law, rule, or provider agreement" in
Subsection (4) for "any false claim"; substituted Subsection (6) and the introductory portion of Subsection (7) for "The violation of any
of the provisions of this section shall be punishable as follows:"; inserted "misappropriated,
fUimft^ or applied" throughout Subsections
(7Xa) to (7)(d); and made minor changes in
phraseology.
The 1985 amendment deleted "or she" following "to which he" in Subsection (1); in Sub•addon (2), deleted "in a manner not provided
hy law* following "knowingly" and substituted
"medical identification card or public assistance warrant, in a manner not provided by
law9 for "or medical identification card"; deleted "from that assistance program" before

"with which that person" in Subsection (3); divided Subsection (4) into introductory Ianguage and Subsections (4)(a) through (4)(f);
substituted "payment as a result of acts described in this subsection'1 for "payment as a
result of those acts" in Subsection (4)(e); substituted "he received in committing frauds of a
similar nature, and not by each separate instance of fraud" for "received during the time
period when frauds of a similar nature occur
and not by each separate instance of fraud during the time period" in Subsection (6); deleted
"by any person" following "or applied for" in
Subsections (7)(a), (7)(b), (7)(c) and (7)(d) and
made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.
The 1986 amendment inserted "or" at the
end of Subsection 7(c) and added Subsection
(8).
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

55-15a-32. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits
— Repayment no defense to criminal action.
(1) In any <;ivil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, a paid state
warrant made to the order of a party shall constitute prima facie evidence
that such party received assistance funds from the state.
(2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, all of the records
in the custody of the department relating to the application for, verification of,
issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall constitute business
records within the meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence:
(3) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the value of the
benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or usual charge for similar
Benefits in the private sector. The value of an authorization to purchase food
•tamps, however, shall be deemed to be the difference between the coupon
allotment thereon and the amount paid by the recipient for that allotment.
(4) lii any criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the repayment of funds
w other benefits obtained in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall
constitute no defense to, or ground for dismissal of, that action.
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APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION NO.

\\

In order to find the defendant guilty of fraudulently
obtaining welfare assistance as charged in the Information, each
of the following elements must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt:
1.

That Carol Candelaria, in Salt Lake County, State of

2.

On or about the dates alleged in the Information;

3.

Knowingly, byj/^false statement, misrepresentation,

Utah;

or other fraudulent means stole and converted to her own use
public assistance funds by failing to disclose her income and
the correct amount of funds held in savings and checking
a c c o u n t s , u/rsrv

-

* /

__.

,

/)

rn >

MILL

_

_

**
*

Ifr y° u find/each and ever^ one of tfhe abov^ elements has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant guilty as charged of the count.

On the other hand, if

you do not find each and every one of the above elements has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not
guilty of that count.
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R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
TONY R. PATTERSON #5128
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: 538-1023

ATTENTIONX

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT—This is not a
County Attorney case.
Please send notices to
the Attorney General's
Office.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

Bail

^Stimmftr?A
JUDGE

Plaintiff,
I N F O R M A T I O N
vs.
CAROL CANDELARIA,
DOB: 05/10/52
Defendant.

cr

8

!2S^ 5 ^ 7

zr-sr-

-w

The undersigned Arlene Call under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of:
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING WELFARE ASSISTANCE, a Second Degree Felony
at Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during September 1 #
1985 through November 30, 1986 in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 55-15(a)-31(l), 1953, as
amended. In that defendant Carol S. Candelaria did
knowingly, by false statement, misrepresentation, or
other fraudulent means steal and convert to her own use
public assistance funds by failing to disclose
$9,419.49 in assests available to her while collecting
monthly financial, medical and foodstajnp benefits from
the State of Utah. The value of the fuftcls or benefits
received exceeds ONE THOUSAND Dollars ($1>000.00).
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:

j^s

/*

Probable cause is established based on State of Utah,
Assistance Payments Administration records which
disclose that defendant fraudulently withheld material
facts or circumstances as noted above; based uopn

Assistance Payments Administration!! Records which show
that defendant received during the time period September
1985 through November 1986 $5,375.00 in AFDC financial '
assistance, and $2,019.00 in food stamps, and $892.45 in
Medical assistance to which her household was ineligible
and based upon account records of National JACI Credit
Union and Zions Bank.
The victim's property is in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AND 45/100 Dollars ($8,286.45) and the
victim is the State of Utah.

This information is
based on evidence
obtained from the
following witnesses:

T^RLENE CALL
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn ,to before me
this / 0
day of y~/'j\{
,
1989.
/

Melodee Williams (0C0)
Robert Banta (OCO)
Kathryn Shigarami (Credit Union
Linda Hirst (Dept. of Fin.)
Vern Tribe (HCF)
Clyde Nuzman (FSI)
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
A u t h o r i z e d f o r presentment
and f i l i n g :

^' J L 0 (iterr
^v\t

R. PAUL VAN DAM
A t t o r n e y Genei

?01T£/R. PATTERSM
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
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